Evolution, Science, and the Qurʾānic Worldview

Muzaffar Iqbal
in Conversation with
Adrien Chauvet and Kamal Dingle

In this annotated conversation with Adrien Chauvet and Kamal Dingle, Muzaffar Iqbal examines the contemporary debate on Islam and evolution within the larger history of the Muslim encounter with modern Western science. He traces the nineteenth-century reception of Darwinism through colonial domination, civilizational decline, and the apologetic impulse to discover precursors of modern scientific theories in the Islamic intellectual tradition.

The discussion then turns to the first principles underlying evolutionary accounts of life and origins, distinguishing scientific investigation of created phenomena from the metaphysical claims of scientific naturalism. Central to the conversation is the Qurʾānic understanding of creation, Divine agency, and the human being, particularly the account of Ādam, upon him peace, the primordial covenant, and fiṭra. Biological similarity, the limits of empirical explanation, and the possibility of using modern science without accepting its underlying worldview are examined in relation to the Qurʾānic understanding of the created order. The conversation concludes by considering the moral purposes of knowledge and the need to recover the Qurʾānic lens through which scientific inquiry becomes a means of recognizing the signs, wisdom, and sovereignty of Allah Most High.

The transcript has been lightly edited; subheadings and footnotes have been added to improve readability and clarify points mentioned in the conversation.

Keywords: Evolution; Islam and science; Qurʾānic worldview; Darwinism; scientific naturalism; *ilāhiyyāt*; Divine agency; Ādamic exceptionalism; *fiṭra*; Islamic scientific tradition.

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Adrien Chauvet

Bismillāh, wa-l-ṣalātu wa-l-salāmu ʿalā Rasūl Allāh. Jazakum Allāhu khayran, and welcome back to this podcast series on evolution from the Burhan Institute. In this series, we are trying to explore the intricate relationship between science and Islam, and more specifically the contemporary debate surrounding Islam and evolution. Our hope is to navigate this field with clarity. I will be hosting the conversation, and I am joined by Dr. Kamal Dingle, Associate Professor at the Gulf University for Science and Technology, who has a background in applied mathematics and quantitative biology.

We are privileged today to welcome Dr. Muzaffar Iqbal. Dr. Iqbal's academic background is in chemistry, but his work has long extended into the larger field of Islam and science. He served in Pakistan as Director of Scientific Information at COMSTECH, the Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Later, in Canada, he directed the Science and Religion Course Program at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. He is the founder and president of the Center for Islamic Sciences and General Editor of the *Integrated Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān*, the second volume of which appeared recently. May Allah Most High place baraka in this work.

Perhaps we can begin with a broad question. Could you summarize your main position on evolution in ten or fifteen minutes, and then we can move into questions and answers?

Muzaffar Iqbal

Bismillāh al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm. Al-ḥamdu li-Llāhi Rabbi l-ʿālamīn, wa-l-ṣalātu wa-l-salāmu ʿalā Rasūlihi l-karīm. Allāhumma ṣalli ʿalā Sayyidinā Muḥammad wa-ʿalā ālihi wa-ṣaḥbihi ajmaʿīn.

This is a valuable effort, *mā shāʾ Allāh*, because it seeks to bring before a wider audience a set of questions that are often misunderstood even before answers are attempted. In fact, when you first asked me about evolution, I asked in return: what do you mean by evolution? That is not a rhetorical question. It is the necessary point of departure, because before an answer can be given, the question itself must be properly framed.

"Evolution" means different things to different people. In this conversation, I assume we are speaking specifically about biological evolution, and more specifically about the theory that came into its modern form in the nineteenth century with the 1859 publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*. Since then, this theory has undergone numerous reformulations,

extensions, qualifications, and reinterpretations, until, for many, it has acquired the status of an established scientific fact. In the Western world in particular, it is now often treated not merely as a biological theory, but as an unquestioned account of the history of life: that all living beings emerged, through a long process, from a common origin—what I sometimes call, deliberately and somewhat provocatively, the "common soup."

If this is the evolution under discussion, then the Muslim response to it has itself passed through several stages over the last century and a half. When Darwinian evolution first entered Muslim lands, most of the Muslim world was under direct or indirect colonial domination. The institutions that had once sustained the Islamic scientific tradition had already suffered a deep collapse. There were, in the nineteenth-century Muslim world, very few scholars who could engage modern biological theory as science, and even fewer who could situate it within the larger metaphysical transformation that had taken place in Europe. Evolution arrived not as an isolated biological claim, but as part of a much larger package: the colonized Muslim world had fallen behind; the West had conquered because it possessed science; Muslims needed science in order to recover; Islam had once produced great scientists; and, therefore, the Qurʾān must be read as commanding the pursuit of modern science in its contemporary Western form.

This was a psychologically powerful narrative. It was repeated in many forms across the Muslim world: in the subcontinent, in Ottoman lands, in Egypt, and elsewhere. There were sincere intentions in some of these efforts. Reformers wanted Muslims to awaken from civilizational decline. They wanted to inspire the pursuit of knowledge. They quoted Qurʾānic verses about reflection upon creation, travel through the earth, observation of the heavens and the earth, and the signs of Allah Most High in the created order. But often these verses were pressed into the service of a project they did not themselves define: the uncritical adoption of modern Western science as the measure of knowledge.

One must therefore distinguish between an "Islamic response" and historically situated Muslim responses. Islam does not speak in the abstract, as if it were a disembodied voice entering a modern conversation. Muslims speak, and they speak from particular intellectual, historical, political, and psychological conditions. The first Muslim responses to Darwinism were shaped by defeat, colonization, loss of institutions, and the felt need to recover civilizational dignity. Many of those responses were emotional and apologetic. Some accepted Darwinism because they believed it represented scientific progress and therefore had to be reconciled with Islam. Others rejected it, but often in equally uninformed ways, reducing the theory to

the caricature that "apes became human beings" and then declaring that claim unbelief. Neither side, in those early stages, generally possessed a deep understanding of the science, the metaphysics, or the civilizational framework from which the theory had emerged.

This is not to say that the situation has remained unchanged. We are not living in 1859. The theory of evolution has changed; Muslim intellectual life has also changed; there are now Muslim scientists, philosophers, theologians, and historians who engage the subject with far greater sophistication. Yet one thing has not changed: the evolutionary account, when presented as a comprehensive explanation of life, remains tied to a particular vision of origins, life, nature, and causality. The question is not merely whether certain biological mechanisms occur. The deeper question is whether life, in its origin and diversification, is to be understood within a closed naturalistic order or within the Qurʾānic order of creation, command, measure, wisdom, and direct divine agency.

It is at this point that contemporary Muslim positions often become unstable. Some now accept the evolutionary account of the diversification of life while making an exception for Ādam, upon him peace. They argue that other living forms may have emerged through evolutionary processes, but that Ādam constitutes a special exception. Others reject even this exception as ad hoc, insisting that if evolution is accepted as the universal history of life, human beings too must be placed within it. This is where the problem becomes not only biological but theological, because the Qurʾānic account of Ādam is not peripheral. It belongs to the very structure of Islamic anthropology, Prophethood, moral responsibility, the covenant, and the meaning of the human being before Allah Most High.

Let me state the matter carefully. I am not issuing a legal ruling, nor am I speaking as a *muftī*. But it is a well-established principle of Islamic belief that Allah Most High is *al-Khāliq*, the Creator of all things. His creative act is not confined to the remote beginning of the cosmos, after which the world unfolds independently through self-sufficient mechanisms. The Qurʾānic account does not permit such a mechanical abstraction. Allah Most High creates, gives life, causes death, sustains, measures, guides, and brings into being. If one were to affirm that any process—whether evolution or anything else—takes place without the act, command, will, and creative agency of Allah Most High, then one has left the domain of Islamic understanding altogether.

This is why the question cannot be reduced to biology alone. It belongs also to what the Islamic intellectual tradition calls *ilāhiyyāt*: those matters that pertain to Allah Most High, to divine action, to being, creation,

causality, life, and the dependence of all things upon Him. In the modern academy, one may call this "metaphysics," but in the Islamic tradition it is not an optional philosophical ornament added to science from outside. It concerns the most fundamental truths about reality.

There are, therefore, two prior questions that must be faced before any meaningful discussion of evolution can begin. First: where did life come from? Second: how did this cosmos, in which we live and think and inquire, come into existence? These questions are ancient. Aristotle wrestled with them, and his answer shaped a vast intellectual inheritance. He argued that matter, as the underlying subject of natural change, must be ungenerated and imperishable: if matter itself came into existence, there would already have to be an underlying subject from which it arose. Thus, for Aristotle, matter always existed.[1] Once matter is regarded as eternal, the question of how life arises within the natural order remains to be addressed.

Darwin did not invent the ancient question of origins. What he did was to propose a particular mechanism for the diversification of life, rather than an explanation of the ultimate origin of life or of the cosmos itself. The Muslim encounter with Aristotle had already taken place many centuries earlier, through the translation movement and the reception of Greek philosophy and science in the Islamic world. But that encounter was not an uncritical surrender. Muslim theologians, philosophers, physicians, astronomers, and commentators received, examined, transformed, and often rejected elements of the Greek inheritance. They did so from within a living civilization whose own first principles were rooted in revelation.

The contrast with the nineteenth-century Muslim reception of modern Western science is striking. By that time, the civilizational institutions that once allowed Muslims to receive, sift, transform, and integrate knowledge had greatly weakened. Modern science came not through a confident civilization receiving foreign knowledge on its own terms, but through

1. Aristotle distinguishes matter (*hylē*, ὕλη) from privation (*sterēsis*, στέρησις) and maintains that matter, considered as potentiality (*dynamis*, δύναμις), must be "imperishable and ungenerated" (*aphtharton kai agenēton*, ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον). His argument is that if matter came into being, an underlying subject would already have to exist from which it arose. See Aristotle, *Physics* I.7–9, especially I.9, 192a25–34, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, https://sourcebooks.web.fordham.edu/ancient/aristotle-physics.asp.

Aristotle separately argues for the eternity of motion and time, concluding that "there never was a time when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion" (*Physics* VIII.1, 252b5–6, same translators, https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.8.viii.html).

colonial power, military domination, educational restructuring, and psychological defeat. That is why so much of the modern Muslim discourse on science has been marked by what I have elsewhere called precursorism: the attempt to prove that whatever modern Europe has discovered, Muslims had already discovered earlier.

This precursorist impulse appears again and again. It is said that Darwin was not truly original because al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bīrūnī, Rūmī, Ibn Khaldūn, Miskawayh, or even al-Rāzī had already proposed evolution; or that Copernicus had been anticipated by al-Ṭūsī; or that every modern discovery, invention, institution, philosophy, or idea must somehow have had its antecedent in the Muslim "Golden Age." The common refrain is: we had already done this before you. Such claims, however, rarely arise from careful historical reading. They arise from a wounded psychology seeking consolation in retrospective invention. Ibn Khaldūn had already diagnosed the deeper structure of this condition in his discussion of conquered peoples imitating their conquerors: the conquered soul, having mistaken material defeat for the intrinsic perfection of the conqueror, begins to assimilate to him in dress, manners, occupations, weapons, institutions, and judgments. In the modern Muslim case, however, science and technology could not be imitated merely by adopting external forms. A compensatory claim therefore emerged: whatever Europe discovered, Muslims must have discovered first. Precursorism is thus not historical scholarship; it is the colonized soul's attempt to recover dignity by inventing priority.

The same applies to the wider history of Islamic science. It is true that the Islamic scientific tradition was one of the longest and most sustained scientific enterprises in human history. From the eighth century onward, across many lands and languages, Muslims cultivated astronomy, mathematics, medicine, optics, geography, pharmacology, mechanics, and numerous other sciences. Even in the fifteenth century, high-level astronomical research was being conducted in places such as Samarqand under Ulugh Beg, and we possess documentary evidence for the seriousness and sophistication of that work, including the famous letters associated with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Jamshīd al-Kāshī.[2] But to acknowledge the greatness of this tradition is one thing; to invent modern theories backward into it is quite another.

The decline of that tradition is a separate and difficult question.

2. E. S. Kennedy, "A Letter of Jamshīd al-Kāshī to His Father: Scientific Research and Personalities at a Fifteenth Century Court," *Orientalia*, n.s., 29 (1960): 191–213; Mohammad Bagheri, "A Newly Found Letter of Al-Kāshī on Scientific Life in Samarkand," *Historia Mathematica* 24, no. 3 (1997): 241–256.

Some have tried to reduce it to simplistic claims, such as the burning of the Istanbul observatory as proof that Islam is hostile to science. Such arguments are historically crude. Scientific traditions do not die because one observatory is destroyed. The circumstances surrounding that event involved political, astrological, and courtly factors, not a Qurʾānic or Islamic opposition to the study of the heavens. The deeper decline was civilizational. By the seventeenth century, the institutions and intellectual energies that had sustained the sciences in Muslim lands had greatly diminished; by the following century, much of that tradition had been severed from its organic roots. The same broad pattern can be seen, in another mode, in the weakening of other scholarly traditions, including tafsīr. I have sometimes described this as an implosion: not simply an external destruction, but a loss of inner vitality, continuity, and institutional form.

This historical background matters because the debate on evolution is not merely about fossils, genes, or mechanisms. It is about the conditions under which Muslims first encountered modern scientific claims, the assumptions they brought to them, and the psychological need to reconcile those claims with Islam at any cost. It is also about the fact that science is never a placeless activity. Science is a civilizational enterprise. One may conduct an experiment in an apartment, but that apartment is in a city; the city is in a country; the country belongs to a history; and the instruments, concepts, institutions, funding structures, and metaphysical assumptions of that science are all situated within a civilization.

Modern science, as we know it today, emerged from a specific civilization with a specific view of nature, knowledge, matter, causality, and the human being. Civilizations have worldviews. The difficulty today is that the technological power of modern science has become so overwhelming that it appears to have erased all alternatives. The same NMR instrument may sit in Madina and Washington, D.C.; it will function according to the same principles and produce the same kinds of data. The technological success of modern science has made it seem universal, neutral, and self-evident. But usefulness and power are not the same as metaphysical neutrality. The fact that modern science produces astonishing technologies does not mean that its governing assumptions about life, nature, and reality are beyond question.

This is where the Muslim discussion must begin again: not with panic, not with apologetics, not with the anxious search for Muslim precursors to Darwin, and not with a shallow rejection of scientific knowledge, but with the recovery of first principles. What is life? What is creation? What is causality? What is the human being? What is nature? What kind of knowledge can

science provide, and what lies beyond its scope? Unless these questions are restored to the center, the debate on evolution will remain confused, because it will be conducted within categories that have already conceded the essential ground.

Technology, Power, and the Erasure of Alternatives

Modern science has not merely displaced other modes of knowing; in many cases, it has wiped them out of public legitimacy. Werner Heisenberg, one of the most perceptive physicists of the twentieth century, had already recognized this problem in the middle of the last century. Every tool, he observed, carries something of the spirit by which it was created. In the West, modern scientific habits of thought emerged gradually, together with industry, engineering, practical activity, and a rational analysis of the conditions required for such activity. Generations had time to adjust to the new methods of thinking. But when modern science entered non-Western societies, it encountered older religious and philosophical traditions suddenly and with great force. The result was not merely intellectual exchange, but a profound confrontation between a globally expanding scientific order and native metaphysical worlds.

Heisenberg's insight helps us understand this condition. The West lived through the gradual emergence of modern science and its associated technologies; colonized Muslims received the finished apparatus suddenly, as power, domination, and spectacle. The shock has not fully passed, even after a century and a half. There is still no living scientific enterprise in the Muslim world that operates from a worldview fundamentally different from modern Western science. What is called science in the Muslim world today is, almost entirely, modern science as received from the West. Its instruments, categories, methods, institutions, assumptions, and prestige structures are the same. Its foundational cosmological and biological narratives are also the same: Big Bang cosmology and evolutionary theory. [3]

This is why the question must be asked: why are these two narratives especially problematic from the perspective of Islam? The answer lies not merely in this or that scientific detail, but in the level at which they operate. They deal with beginnings: the beginning of the cosmos and the beginning of life. These are not secondary matters. They touch the foundation of existence itself.

Ilāhiyyāt and the Boundaries of Science

3. See Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1999), 27–28.

When we use the word "metaphysics," we must first ask what we mean by it. I would prefer, at least within an Islamic discussion, to speak of *ilāhiyyāt*. "Metaphysics" is a term that comes from another intellectual history. In the Aristotelian corpus, physics concerned the study of the natural, material world; what came "after" or "beyond" physics came to be called metaphysics. When Aristotle entered Arabic intellectual culture through translation and commentary, Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Sīnā developed elaborate discussions of *ilāhiyyāt*, because the questions at stake were not merely about what lies beyond physics in a classificatory sense. They were about Allah Most High, being, creation, causality, the dependence of the world, and the order of existence.

In the Qurʾānic worldview, the issue is not that one first studies the physical world and then, by extrapolation, perhaps moves beyond it. The direction is reversed. One begins with the Creator, with the reality that Allah Most High is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden; that there is nothing whatsoever like unto Him; that everything other than Allah Most High is created. Everything other than Him has a beginning, and its existence, measure, and duration depend entirely upon His Will.

This is where Aristotle's solution to the problem of origins becomes impossible for Islam. Aristotle held that the world had no temporal beginning and that matter was not brought into existence from nothing. His account of nature therefore proceeded from an eternal cosmic order rather than from creation in time. Everything other than Allah Most High is created. Everything other than Him has a beginning, a measure, a term, and an end. All things perish save His Face; He is the First and the Last; there is nothing like unto Him.

Once creation is affirmed, time enters the discussion. To say that something was created is also to say that it did not exist, and then came into existence through the act of Allah Most High. When we ask where the cosmos came from, we are also asking when it came into existence. "Where" and "when" are linked in the very grammar of created being. If I say that I was born in 1954, I am saying that I did not exist in this worldly form before that time. Likewise, if the cosmos came into existence, then there was no physical cosmos before its creation. There was no "physics" in the sense of a physical order to be studied. Physics itself begins only after creation.

This is why *ilāhiyyāt* gives us the correct vantage point from which to understand the physical world. One must, in a sense, stand outside the system in order to understand the system. A person driving a car does not see the whole mechanism while driving; the one who opens the hood from outside can examine its structure. Likewise, the physical world cannot

explain its own ultimate origin. It can be studied from within, but it cannot, by itself, account for why there is a physical world at all.

This also brings us to the question of the boundaries of knowledge. Every discipline has a proper subject matter and a legitimate domain of inquiry. Fiqh deals with rulings and the understanding of the Sharīʿa; history deals with peoples, events, places, and temporal sequences; mathematics deals with number, shape, space, structure, relation. Every science has boundaries. But in the modern world, "science" has been granted a boundless authority. Scientists are asked to tell us how life began, how the cosmos began, what food is best for us, what colors correspond to our temperaments, what drugs will regulate our bodies, and, increasingly, what the human being is. Science has been given not only what belongs to it, but also what does not belong to it. This is scientism: the transformation of a powerful and legitimate mode of inquiry into the supreme arbiter of all truth.

The study of cells, bodies, organs, bones, and nerves can produce astonishing knowledge. I once injured my finger with a table saw and went to the hospital. The doctors could see, with extraordinary precision, the details of the bones, nerves, and tissues in my finger. This is a remarkable achievement of accumulated knowledge about the physical body. But when Allah Most High asks, in the Qurʾān, whether the human being thinks that We shall not assemble his bones—*indeed, We are able to restore even his fingertips*—that is a question of another order. It is not a denial of anatomical knowledge; it is a summons to recognize divine power, resurrection, measure, and the signs of Allah Most High in the most intimate details of the human form.[2]

This distinction is crucial. The problem arises when science oversteps its boundaries and claims authority over questions that belong to *ilāhiyyāt*: the origin of being, the source of life, the meaning of the human being, the order of creation, the final return, and the reality of divine agency.

Creation, Signs, and the Failure of Reduction

One of my strongest arguments against the totalizing scientific worldview is not itself a scientific argument; it is a metaphysical argument. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, everything the modern account claims. Let us accept the Big Bang narrative as stated. Let us accept the evolutionary narrative as stated. Let us accept all the mechanisms, sequences, and historical reconstructions. Now ask: can this account give us mountains that hymn the praises of Allah Most High with one of His Prophets? Can it give us ants that recognize the army of Sulaymān, upon him peace, and warn one another to enter their dwellings? Can it give us a hoopoe that serves a

Prophet? Can it give us a bee that receives instruction from its Lord?

These are not decorative details in the Qurʾān. They belong to the Qurʾānic account of reality. The Qurʾān presents a world filled with signs, speech, praise, recognition, submission, and forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to mechanism. One may, of course, declare all of this metaphorical. Some have done so. The ants become metaphorical; the mountains become metaphorical; the bee becomes metaphorical; Ādam becomes metaphorical; the covenant becomes metaphorical. But if everything that resists the modern worldview is made metaphorical, then the Qurʾānic world itself is dissolved.

Imām al-Ghazālī, in *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*, draws attention to the bee. Consider the beehive. Bees construct hexagonal cells. This is not an arbitrary form. The hexagon permits the greatest economy of material with the strongest structure and the greatest storage capacity. Circles would leave empty spaces; squares would stack well but would not correspond to the curved body of the bee; triangles would not serve the same purpose. The hexagonal form is geometrically optimal. How did the bee know? Did bees hold international conferences across continents in order to arrive at this solution? The question is not meant as jest only. It points to a deeper reality: the created order is not blind matter organizing itself without command, measure, or guidance. The Qurʾān says: *And your Lord inspired the bee*.[4]

At this level, evolution is not simply one theory among others. It becomes dangerous when it requires the reinterpretation of the Qurʾānic account of creation, the hierarchy of being, the signs in the horizons and within ourselves, the special creation of Ādam, and the direct agency of Allah Most High. To remove Allah from any domain is already a grave error. But there are degrees of error. A theory of color psychology or a limited theory in geology may be problematic if it excludes divine agency, but it does not necessarily operate at the foundation of existence. Evolution and Big Bang cosmology are different because they speak about first things: the beginning of life and the beginning of the cosmos. They concern *wujūd*, existence itself. To remove Allah Most High from this level is not like removing one room from the seventh floor of a house; it is like removing the foundation.

Theistic Evolution and the Problem of Insertion

Some Muslims, like some Christians, attempt to solve the problem by accepting common ancestry while saying that Allah guided the process. They affirm the fossil record, the evolutionary narrative, and the continuity of life, but add that divine guidance operated through it. The difficulty with this

4. Q 16:68.

position is that it inserts the hand of God where needed and removes it where it is not wanted. It rents a room in another person's house. The structure, categories, history, mechanisms, and evidentiary framework remain those of the modern evolutionary worldview; Allah Most High is then introduced as an additional explanatory layer. But the landlord is someone else. When the landlord says, "This addition is unnecessary," God is pushed out again.

Why do we feel compelled to do this? Because we have accepted, as given, a world constructed over the last two centuries without us. We did not examine the fossil record from within our own living scientific tradition. We did not ask the questions from within an intact Qurʾānic metaphysical order. We woke up, after a long civilizational sleep, and found a world already interpreted. In this sense, the Muslim Umma resembles, in a reversed and tragic way, the People of the Cave. They awoke after centuries and found the world transformed for the better, from disbelief to belief. We awoke after centuries of decline and found the world interpreted through categories in which Allah Most High had already been excluded from the explanatory order. Then we tried to take Allah out of our pocket and place Him into someone else's house, because we cannot live without Him.

But this is not the Qurʾānic way. The Qurʾān does not allow Allah Most High to be an explanatory supplement added to an otherwise autonomous world. The world is His creation from beginning to end. His command, measure, wisdom, and sustaining act are not occasional interventions; they are the condition of the existence of every thing at every moment.

Fiṭra, Covenant, and the Inner World

The problem with evolution is not confined to common ancestry. It extends to the meaning of the human being. The Qurʾān speaks of the *fiṭra* of Allah upon which He has created humankind (Q 30:30). The Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, said that every child is born upon the *fiṭra*, and that it is the parents who subsequently make the child Jewish, Christian, or Magian. The distinction is between the original condition in which the human being is created and what is subsequently introduced through upbringing. Early Qurʾānic exegetes, including Mujāhid (d. ca. 104/722) and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728), identified this *fiṭra* as Islam. In his explanation of *ṣibghat Allāh*—the *ṣibgha* of Allah (Q 2:138)—al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) preserves interpretations identifying it both with the religion of Allah and with the *fiṭra* upon which He created humankind. The human being does not enter this world without an original constitution bestowed by Allah.

This *fiṭra* is also connected in early Qurʾānic exegesis with the primordial covenant mentioned in Sūrat al-Aʿrāf: *Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes indeed,*

we bear witness (Q 7:172). Yaḥyā b. Sallām (d. 200/815) explicitly explains Q 30:30 through this verse. The covenant was not an incidental statement. Allah Most High says that it was taken so that human beings could not claim on the Day of Resurrection that they had been unaware, or that they had merely followed their forefathers (Q 7:172–173).

The human being's worldly life thus unfolds in relation to an acknowledgment of Divine Lordship that precedes it. Yet the human being remains responsible for the response made in this life: *We have guided him to the way, whether grateful or ungrateful* (Q 76:3). This responsibility is further affirmed: *And say: The truth is from your Lord; so whoever wills, let him believe, and whoever wills, let him disbelieve* (Q 18:29). Nor does the soul's original endowment remove the moral responsibility of its possessor: *By the soul and He Who proportioned it, and inspired it with its wickedness and its godfearingness. He has indeed succeeded who purifies it, and he has indeed failed who corrupts it* (Q 91:7–10).

This is where the evolutionary reduction of the human being collapses from the perspective of faith. The human being is not merely a biological organism produced by an impersonal process. Each human being bears an inner world: perception, taste, grief, joy, memory, longing, knowledge, fear, hope, love, remorse, and recognition. These are not abstractions. They are immediate realities.

Consider something as simple as taste. I drank coffee this morning; you may also have drunk coffee. We can speak about the taste, describe it, compare it, analyze it chemically, but the actual experience of that taste is mine, and yours is yours. Or consider the taste of pomegranate from childhood. I may carry that taste within me for decades. Someone who has never tasted pomegranate will not know it by description alone. Experience has an inward singularity.

This inwardness is not captured by evolutionary mechanism. Each human being is a unique, singular existent. There are commonalities, of course; sociologists may classify types, psychologists may identify patterns, biologists may describe shared structures. But the person remains irreducibly singular before Allah Most High. Each has a soul, an inward world, a history, an intellect, acts, intentions, and a book. Even this conversation is being recorded not merely by a machine, but by angels. What we say is written. We will see that record. And we ask Allah Most High that what comes from our tongues be written among the deeds of the people of the right.

Modern Science, Utility, and Historical Contingency

Adrien Chauvet

With respect to modern science, then, how and when do you take it into account in order to act in the world, explain the world, or progress materially? In other words, how and when do you use modern science?

Muzaffar Iqbal

We are historical beings. Muslims are historical beings. The Qurʾān itself was revealed in a given historical situation, in a language that already existed, over a period of twenty-three years, to a people living within a concrete human world shaped by earlier centuries. Likewise, we are now sitting in 2026 within our own historical situation. We are dealing with bodies of knowledge, technologies, modes of communication, ways of constructing houses, producing food, making clothes, organizing economies, and imagining progress—all of which have emerged through the last three centuries of modern scientific and technological development.

The first task, therefore, is to see this development historically. We must ask: why did Galileo, Newton, and their successors arise in a particular civilization at a particular moment? What was the metaphysical structure of that civilization? What kind of view of nature, power, matter, and the human being made modern science possible in the form in which it emerged? If we could look at the last three centuries from a vantage point outside the system—as if looking down from the moon upon the unfolding of this entire trajectory—we would see not merely a body of neutral techniques, but a civilization producing knowledge according to its own inner drives.

When modern science becomes universalized through power, technology, military force, communication systems, and global dependence, it becomes difficult to ask what is permissible, what is useful, what can be accepted, and what must be rejected. But the real question is not merely whether one may use this or that instrument or procedure. The real question is worldview. I can still use certain laboratory techniques to investigate the human body, but I must do so from within a different understanding of the body, life, health, creation, and human purpose.

Take food as an example. Modern agricultural science can produce mass quantities of bananas through systems tied to plantation economies, genetic manipulation, profit, distribution networks, and artificial consumption. But one may ask: do I need ten bananas, or do I need one real banana? The question is not merely technical; it concerns desire, need, consumption, resources, land, labor, and the artificial production of appetite. Modern science does not arrive alone; it arrives with an entire order of life.

This order is powerful, but it is not permanent. That is one of the most important things Muslims must understand. The present arrangement of the world should not be mistaken for an eternal given. Modern technological civilization appears immense, but it rests on fragile foundations. Much of what we use every day depends on electromagnetic systems. A small disturbance in the magnetic field, a breakdown in the electrical grid, and suddenly banking systems, communication networks, medical devices, transportation, and ordinary transactions cease to function. We experience this even in small ways: the lights go out, one goes to the bank, and the system is down. Nothing moves.

The Qurʾān trains us not to absolutize any worldly order. Firʿawn is the archetype of worldly power claiming lordship. He awakens one morning, commands his forces, pursues the fleeing Children of Israel, and before the day is over, he and his army are gone. Entire arrangements of power can be overturned in a single historical moment. We have example after example in history—not merely metaphorical examples, but real historical transformations in which an order that seemed permanent disappeared.

Therefore, the first principle is this: do not take the current order of existence as permanent. Do not take modern science, modern technology, modern political arrangements, or modern economic systems as final. The earth belongs to Allah Most High. He remains in command of every single thing that occurs. He has given us minds, intellects, and the capacity to reflect upon His signs, so that we may arrive at conclusions that are not simply the conclusions of Darwin, or of modern empires, or of any current power. This, in our time, is among the great forms of intellectual jihād: to see the limits of the present world order—not only its science, but its political, economic, technological, and moral orders.

We already see the moral decay of the present order. This is visible even to those who benefit from its power. The issue, then, is not that we deny power. We do not deny the power of modern aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems, or technological precision. But we refuse to accept power as truth. If one possesses the Qurʾānic worldview, then even death is not ultimate defeat, because death is meeting Allah Most High. For the believer, death is passage to something better, if Allah grants His mercy. That is why the memory of the shahāda of Imām Ḥusayn, Allah be pleased with him, has remained alive for more than fourteen centuries. In some cultures, especially in Iran, one sees this grief and memory renewed every Muḥarram: Imām Ḥusayn stands as the symbol of truth against tyranny, forever.

A people who say, *we are going to meet our Lord*, cannot ultimately be defeated by worldly power. Individuals can be killed; buildings can be

destroyed; entire cities can be bombed; but a worldview rooted in return to Allah Most High cannot be conquered by machines. This is why the "givens" of modern science, the "givens" of the present political order, and the "givens" of the current technological world must not be treated as givens by Muslim thinkers, scholars, or ordinary believers. Everything must be placed before the Qurʾānic lens.

Genetic Similarity and the Harmony of Created Life

Adrien Chauvet

Returning to evolution, when you look at genetic similarities between animals, plants, and human beings, what is your reaction? Is it simply to see beauty, or can one also see relation, correlation, or signs of a common Creator?

Muzaffar Iqbal

This is a very important aspect of the debate, and one I had not yet touched upon. The commonality among living species, which is one of the cornerstones of evolutionary argument, can be understood from a completely different perspective. That perspective comes directly from the Qurʾān.

Allah Most High says in Sūrat al-Baqara: *Indeed, I am placing upon the earth a khalīfa*. This is a choice of place and species. The place is the earth. Out of the vast cosmos created by Allah Most High, this planet was chosen as the earthly abode of a being who did not exist before in this form, a being made suitable for life on this earth. If Allah Most High had willed to populate the moon, or Mars, or any other place, He could have created beings suitable to those places. Indeed, Allah's creation extends far beyond what we know. But the human being was created for this earthly order.

This means that the entire earthly order must possess compatibility. Allah Most High created the human being with a physical structure suited to this planet, and He created around the human being animals, plants, minerals, water, air, soil, seasons, and foods suitable to the life of this species. The Qurʾān also reminds us that the Messengers were human beings who ate food and walked in the markets. This eating and walking are not incidental details. They indicate embodiment, dependence, environment, and compatibility with the order of earthly life.[1]

As you know, I have a background in chemistry, and I know that if even a single element necessary to our bodily constitution were absent, or if elements existed in forms wholly incompatible with our constitution, human life would not be possible. Even substances that are poisonous in one

quantity or form exist within the larger order of chemical reality in precise relations. For us to live, there must be harmony at the chemical, biological, physiological, and ecological levels. The sheep, the camel, the plants, the grains, the fruits, the water, the air—all exist within a range of compatibility. They do not exist in isolation. They belong to one created order.

From this perspective, biological similarity is not evidence that all life is the product of blind descent from a common ancestor. It is evidence of harmony within a single created order. There must be common chemistry because there is common earthly life. There must be biological compatibility because the created beings of this earth live in relation to one another. The animals we eat, the plants we cultivate, the beasts of burden we use, the ecosystems we inhabit—all must share sufficient compatibility for life together to be possible.

The evolutionary interpretation takes this compatibility and reads it as descent. But the Qurʾānic interpretation sees it as created harmony, measure, and suitability. Similarity does not prove genealogy. It may indicate common design, common environment, shared earthly constitution, and divine wisdom in creating interdependent forms of life. To say that apes resemble human beings in certain respects is not to say that human beings descend from apes or from a common ape-like ancestor. I have not seen a single ape produce Shakespeare's plays. That may sound humorous, but it points to a serious distinction: we are dealing with different orders of reality. The human being is not exhausted by physical resemblance.

Life on earth exists within a larger cosmic order, but even if we restrict ourselves to the earth, the living beings upon it possess different degrees and kinds of perception, awareness, and capacity. Animals reproduce, care for their young, seek food, respond to danger, and live within patterns suited to them. A farmer helping a goat give birth can intervene because there is a biological process recognizable across mammalian life. Such commonality is real. But its reality does not require the metaphysical conclusion that all forms emerged from a self-organizing evolutionary process without direct divine creation and command.

The commonality of living beings is therefore a sign. But a sign is not exhausted by physical investigation. Allah Most High does not merely command us to examine the camel physiologically, chemically, or anatomically—although such examination may be legitimate within its proper bounds. The Qurʾānic summons is greater: *Do they not look at the camel, how it was created?* The camel is to be seen within the composite picture of life, provision, travel, desert, human need, divine mercy, and created form. The sign points beyond itself to the One who created it.[2]

Taking this further, can one still use science to explain these processes? Up to what point can science explain what is happening?

Muzaffar Iqbal

Yes, and here we can learn from the Islamic scientific tradition itself. What did Ibn al-Haytham do? What did Ibn Sīnā, al-Bīrūnī, and others do when they investigated physical phenomena? They observed, measured, experimented, reasoned, and argued. They were not hostile to the study of nature. On the contrary, they cultivated sciences of remarkable depth.

It is also clear that modern science has accumulated an unprecedented amount of knowledge about physical processes. I am not speaking merely of information, but of detailed knowledge: molecular, anatomical, astronomical, chemical, geological, and technological. The example I gave earlier about the medical examination of my injured finger illustrates the degree of precision modern science can attain. But an increase in detail does not alter the ultimate conclusion required from the believer; it deepens it. The more one knows about the created order, the more one should recognize its measure, dependence, wisdom, and signs.

Consider an example from the Islamic scientific tradition. Ibn Sīnā (370–428/980–1037) and al-Bīrūnī (362–440/973–1048), who were contemporaries, corresponded about physical questions. Al-Bīrūnī asked why a flask filled with water breaks when its contents freeze, although bodies ordinarily contract upon cooling. Ibn Sīnā explained that contraction would produce a vacuum, which he considered impossible, and that the vessel therefore breaks. Al-Bīrūnī also asked why ice floats on water. Ibn Sīnā attributed this to airy particles retained in the ice.

We now know that ice is less dense than liquid water and therefore occupies greater volume. [5]

This property is not a trivial curiosity. If ice were denser than water, then bodies of water would freeze from the bottom upward, and marine life would be devastated every winter. Instead, ice forms on the surface, while liquid water remains below, allowing life to continue. Muslim scientists observed such phenomena and reflected upon them within a worldview

5. Rafik Berjak and Muzaffar Iqbal, "Ibn Sīnā—al-Bīrūnī Correspondence—IV," Islam & Science 2, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 181–188, especially 187, Questions Seven and Eight.

in which the physical order was not closed upon itself. The observed fact became a doorway to wisdom.

We can do the same today. We may use modern scientific knowledge, but we must look at it through our own worldview. We do not deny the data; we do not deny physical processes; we do not deny the power of experiment or the utility of technique. But we refuse to allow those data and techniques to dictate the final meaning of existence. The lens matters.

Al-Ghazālī offers a particularly revealing example in *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*. Discussing the Divine mercy invoked in Sūrat al-Fātiḥa, he directs attention to the fly, the spider, and the bee, describing the capacities with which each has been endowed. He then considers the hexagonal construction of the honeycomb, explaining through geometrical reasoning why this form permits the efficient arrangement of its cells. Yet the demonstration does not end with geometry. Al-Ghazālī asks the reader to contemplate how Allah guided the bee to this particular form, seeing in it an example of the wonders of Divine workmanship, gentleness, and mercy. He immediately adds that what human beings have discovered of such wonders is exceedingly little compared with what remains beyond their knowledge. Scientific observation and mathematical demonstration thus have their proper place, but neither exhausts the meaning of what is observed. The created phenomenon becomes intelligible at one level through geometry and at another through its relation to Divine guidance and mercy. [6]

This is an essential principle for our use of modern science. The question is not whether modern science has accumulated knowledge. It has. The question is: what is the purpose of that knowledge? What fruit does it bear? Does it lead to gratitude, recognition, justice, restraint, and worship? Or does it lead to domination, consumption, heedlessness, and destruction?

The Qurʾānic perspective requires us to judge knowledge by its place in the human journey. We are all travelers: you and I, the ants, the sun, the moon, the planets, and all created things. Everything is moving toward its appointed term. Imām al-Ghazālī, in Jawāhir al-Qurʾān, identifies the supreme purpose of the Qurʾān in words of extraordinary precision: "The innermost meaning (*sirr*) of the Qurʾān, its purest essence (*lubābuhu l-asfā*), and its supreme purpose (*maqṣaduhu l-aqṣā*) is to summon servants to the Supreme Lord." He then distinguishes three fundamental purposes: to make known the One to Whom the summons is directed; to make known the straight path that must be followed in journeying toward Him; and to make known the condition of the servant upon reaching Him. These are

6. Al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā al-Qabbānī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-ʿUlūm, 1406/1986), 67–69, especially 68.

not three disconnected subjects, but three movements of a single journey: from the recognition of Allah Most High, through the path of existentially knowing our relationship to Him as His *ʿibād*, slaves in the Qurʾānic sense, to the final encounter. If this framework is applied to any branch of knowledge, including modern science, our conclusions will change. We would not destroy species, manipulate food without moral restraint, turn knowledge into instruments of domination, or imagine that increasing production is the highest human good. [7]

Progress, Power, and Moral Decline

The modern idea of progress must also be questioned. We assume that humanity is always moving upward, but the Qurʾānic understanding of history does not support such *naïveté*. The Qurʾān does not present worldly history as an indefinite ascent toward perfection; it places every worldly order under the certainty of an appointed end, the final Hour. In many respects, modern science and technology have accelerated decay. Food itself provides a simple example. In my childhood, there were many varieties of fruit, each with taste, texture, season, and locality. Now everything is standardized for profit, transportability, shelf life, and mass distribution. A banana may have a thick skin and no taste; an apple may sit on a counter for a month with the same color, but with no life in it. Variety, locality, taste, and nourishment have been sacrificed to commercial uniformity.

This pattern extends far beyond food. Even places that were once protected from the destructive reach of modernity have now been absorbed. This is why Muslims, especially Muslims living in the West, have a special role to play. Earlier generations of Muslim reformers confronted the ascendancy of Western power at a time when the institutions and intellectual traditions of their own civilization had been profoundly weakened. They saw the changed world and were overwhelmed by it. We should now have a better understanding of the last three centuries. History is essential, and especially the history of modern science: its driving forces, its funding, its military entanglements, its political uses, and its technological applications.

One must understand that many technologies now woven into everyday life have emerged from, or been profoundly shaped by, research directed toward military, industrial, and political ends. Consider the microwave oven, which emerged from wartime radar research: the magnetron developed for detecting enemy aircraft and ships was subsequently adapted to heat food. Or consider the Global Positioning System (GPS), developed under the United States Department of Defense for military navigation

7. *Ibid.*, 23.

and positioning, which now guides civilian aircraft, ships, vehicles, and countless ordinary journeys. These examples reveal how deeply the history of modern technology is intertwined with military power. Lasers, communication systems, surveillance tools, and many other technologies have histories similarly entangled with political and industrial interests. The precision with which a missile can target a single apartment in a vast city is a terrifying display of applied science. It is technical brilliance in the service of destruction. This is the satanic use of knowledge. [8]

We believe that such use of knowledge will be judged by Allah Most High. The purposes for which knowledge is pursued cannot be separated from the conditions under which it is produced, the questions it is directed toward answering, and the ends it is made to serve. We cannot simply say that science is neutral and only its use matters. The aims, funding, institutions, applications, and moral imagination of a science shape what it becomes. Nor can we merely speak of "Islamizing" science if by that we mean placing Islamic labels upon an enterprise whose inner purposes remain unchanged. The question is deeper: what knowledge do we seek, why do we seek it, and toward what end is it ordered?

At the same time, the preservation of Muslim civilization requires the cultivation of knowledge and the development of the means necessary for its protection. The Qurʾān commands: *And prepare against them whatever force you can muster, and horses held ready, that thereby you may deter the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others besides them whom you do not know, but Allah knows them. And whatever you expend in the path of Allah shall be repaid to you in full, and you shall not be wronged* (Q 8:60).

The verse brings together preparedness, deterrence, expenditure, and Divine recompense. Its command to muster whatever force lies within human capacity is not confined to the means available in any one age, even as it explicitly names the horses held ready by its first hearers. The cultivation

8. For the development of the microwave oven from radar technology used during the Second World War, see Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, "Cook Today . . . Tomorrow's Way," *FOOD: Transforming the American Table*, https://americanhistory.si.edu/explore/exhibitions/food/online/new-and-improved/help-home-cook/cook-today-tomorrows-way.

For the military origins of satellite navigation and the subsequent development of GPS, see Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), "Transit Satellite: Space-Based Navigation," https://www.darpa.mil/about/innovation-timeline/transit-satellite-space-based-navigation; and "Miniaturized GPS Receivers," https://www.darpa.mil/about/innovation-timeline/miniaturized-gps-receivers.

of capabilities thus belongs to responsible action under Divine command, while the promise of recompense places the expenditure of resources within the horizon of accountability to Allah Most High. Even in its instructions for prayer under conditions of danger, the Qurʾān commands the believers to take their precautions and their arms, permitting the laying aside of arms under certain circumstances while maintaining the command to take precautions (Q 4:102; cf. Q 4:71).

One cannot face brute force with slogans. Individually, the believer who dies in the path of truth goes to Allah Most High; but as a civilization, Muslims must possess the means to defend life, truth, worship, and the integrity of the Umma. This too belongs to the proper use of knowledge: not domination, not tyranny, but preservation, justice, and survival under the command of Allah Most High.

Kamal Dingle

From my side, I believe you have answered all the questions.

Adrien Chauvet

Al-ḥamdu li-Llāh. Thank you very much. We have had discussions with others, and Dr. Kamal and I have also discussed these questions between ourselves. Usually the questions are framed in a particular way, but you have approached them from a completely different angle. It is as though you have asked us to look at the question itself from another direction, and that has been very useful and illuminating.

Muzaffar Iqbal

Al-ḥamdu li-Llāh. Allah Most High granted us this opportunity to discuss these issues, which actually goes back to two fundamental questions: (i) How this wonderful cosmos came into existence and (ii) how life began. These are foundational questions and when we go to science to find answers, it is as if we are going to the blacksmith to get our gold earrings.

We have in our tradition *al-Mabādīʾ al-ʿAshara*, Ten Foundational Principles—which were formulated when Greek scientific and philosophical works were translated into Arabic. Aristotle in particular came with a powerful and internally cohesive narrative about the cosmos and life. His philosophical views about the cosmos and life were opposed to what Revelation teaches about these same realities. As a result, a conflict arose at the most fundamental level: Aristotle attracted the philosophers who attempted to harmonize his teachings with the Revelation they believed in, but their attempts twisted the interpretation of the Revelation to

accommodate Aristotelian cosmology. In particular, the question of eternity of the universe became a contested and simmering ground. Over the course of the next three centuries, these questions led to the formulation of the principles which can be used to answer questions such as these: What happens when the created order and life are examined from outside the Revelation? What happens when the lens through which life and its origin is seen is replaced? These principles were called *al-mabādiʾ* because they really deal with the foundations of every branch of knowledge; they frame knowledge. I have a new book in progress about *al-Mabādīʾ al-ʿAshara* and we have already crossed the time limit we had agreed, but let me quickly sum them up:

The Ten Foundational Principles of Every Branch of Knowledge

i. *al-Ḥadd* (Definition and Boundaries): What is this discipline, and what are its boundaries?

ii. *al-Mawḍūʿ* (Subject): What is the reality—or coherent set of realities—concerning which this branch of knowledge conducts its inquiry, and under what determinate respect does it investigate it?

iii. *al-Thamara* (Fruit): What does this branch of knowledge, through its acquisition and practice, yield?

iv. *Faḍluhu* (Its Excellence): What excellence or distinction does this branch of knowledge possess in relation to other branches of knowledge, and in what respect does it possess it?

v. *Nisbatuhu* (Its Relation): Where does this branch of knowledge stand within the larger order of knowledge, and what relations connect it with and distinguish it from other branches?

vi. *al-Wāḍiʿ* (Establisher): Who first gathered and established this body of knowledge as a determinate branch of knowledge?

vii. *al-Ism* (Name): By what name is this branch of knowledge designated, and what body of knowledge does that name identify?

viii. *al-Istimdād* (Sources): From where does it derive its knowledge?

ix. *Ḥukm al-Shāriʿ* (Legal Ruling): What is its standing before Allah?

x. *al-Masāʾil* (Core Questions): What issues does it address?

If we apply the first principle, *al-ḥadd*, to science, a lot of confusion will disappear and many prior questions will be resolved. We will no longer be going to science to ask how the cosmos and life began; our gold earrings will come from the goldsmith; every branch of knowledge will be properly named, delimited, and situated within the hierarchy of knowledge that

Revelation has established and then we can discuss questions in the light of the Book which itself is Light and Guidance for those who reflect.

May Allah Most High accept our efforts. May He grant us the *tawfiq* and ability to see things as they truly are. May our preconceived ideas perish in the Light of the Book; may we be released from the darknesses of the veils:

إلهي إلهي، خلّصنا عن الاشتغال بالملاهي، وأرنا حقائق الأشياء كما هي.

غشاوهٔ غفلت از بصر بصیرت ما بگشای و هر جزو را چنانکه هست بنمای.

نیستی را بر ما در صورت هستی جلوه مده؛ از نیستی بر جمال هستی پرده منه.

این صور خیالی را آینهٔ تجلیات جمال خود کن، نه علت حجاب و دوری؛

و این نقوش وهمی را سرمایهٔ دانایی و بینایی ما گردان، نه علت جهالت و کوری.

مهجوری و محرومی ما همه از ماست؛ ما را با ما مگذار؛

ما را از ما رهایی کرامت کن، و با خود آشنایی ارزانی دار.9

Allah, Allah, deliver us from preoccupation with diversions, and show us the realities of things as they truly are.

Remove the veil of heedlessness from the eye of our inner sight, and show us each thing as it truly is.

Do not cause non-being to appear to us in the form of being, nor let non-being cast a veil over the beauty of being.

Make these forms of imagination mirrors of the self-disclosures of Your beauty, rather than causes of veiling and separation.

Make these images of illusion the means of our knowledge and insight, rather than causes of ignorance and blindness.

Our estrangement and deprivation arise entirely from ourselves. Do not leave us to ourselves.

Graciously deliver us from ourselves, and bestow upon us intimacy with Yourself.

9. For an Arabic translation of Jāmī's supplication, see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī, *Lawāʾiḥ al-Ḥaqq wa-Lawāmiʿ al-ʿIshq*, trans. and intro. Muḥammad ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Manṣūr (Cairo: Supreme Council for Culture, 2003), 12.